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This paper examines the cross‐border effectiveness of
bank resolution measures in the context of current
and soon‐to‐be revised Chinese bank insolvency legisla-
tion, that is, the Bank Resolution Regulation. The gen-
eral framework is regulated in the Chinese Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law. With regard to the outgoing effects
of Chinese bank resolution measures, the ultimate deci-
sion is in the hands of China's counterparts. However,
it is proposed that the contractual approach could be
a solution to enhance legal certainty. On the other
hand, the incoming effectiveness of foreign resolution
measures has to be firstly recognised in China. Three
major tests in terms of recognition and enforcement
are international agreement, reciprocity, and public
policy exception. These criteria should be interpreted
against the background of emerging international
regime for bank resolution and latest development in
the Chinese legal community.1 | INTRODUCTION
The 2007/2008 financial crisis witnessed the ineffectiveness of traditional corporate insolvency
regime for an orderly resolution of financial institutions. World leaders from G20 countries
called for the development of “resolution tools and frameworks for the effective resolution of
financial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution failures and reduce- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 GUOmoral hazard in future.”1 Against this backdrop, administrative authorities (resolution author-
ities) are empowered to take administrative measures (resolution measures) to orderly resolve
ailing financial institutions. Three major paradigm shifts from bank insolvency to bank resolu-
tion were identified by Haentjens and Wessels, namely, from individual to public interest, from
judicial to government authorities control, and from national regulation to harmonisation and
unification.2 Public interest is a major concern for resolution authorities to take resolution mea-
sures, that is, to avoid systemic risks and maintain financial stability. Apart from the traditional
judicial insolvency instruments, such as reorganisation or liquidation, resolution is now an
additional insolvency instrument conferring on administrative authorities to take action against
banks in distress.
At the international level, efforts have been made to harmonise national resolution laws and
to achieve an effective global resolution regime. A detailed proposal was formulated by the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2011 as the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes
for Financial Institutions (Key Attributes, or KAs),3 which was later updated in 2014.4 Under
the new resolution regime, shareholders and creditors are supposed to absorb the losses first
instead of using taxpayers' money to bail out banks. Three types of resolution powers were sum-
marized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF):
(i) assumption of control, that is, to “replace management, clawback remuneration/bonuses”
and to “appoint an administrator to take control/manage the firm”;
(ii) resolution tools, that is, to “transfer assets, liabilities to an existing entity, a bridge bank or
an asset management company”; to “bail‐in creditors to recapitalize the failed bank or
successor”; and to “override stakeholders rights to approve merger, sale, capital injection
etc.”;
(iii) supportive measures, that is, to “suspend payments to unsecured creditors and stay cred-
itor actions”; to “temporarily stay early termination rights”; and to “oblige related group
entities to continue to provide essential services and functions.”5
In accordance with the FSB resolution reform report as of May 2017,6 many jurisdictions,
mostly Global Systemically Important Banks (G‐SIBs) home jurisdictions,7 have implemented1G20, “Leaders' Statement The Pittsburgh Summit” (2009).
2Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels, “Three Paradigm Shifts in Recent Bank Insolvency Law” (2016) 31 Journal of
International Banking Law and Regulation 396; Matthias Haentjens and Bob Wessels, “Conclusions” in Matthias
Haentjens and Bob Wessels (eds), Research Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar, 2015).
3FSB, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” (2011).
4FSB, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” (2014). On October 15, 2014, the FSB
adopted additional guidance that elaborates on specific Key Attributes relating to information sharing for resolution pur-
poses and sector‐specific guidance that sets out how the Key Attributes should be applied for insurers, financial market
infrastructure (FMIs) and the protection of client assets in resolution. No changes were made to the text of the 2011
twelve Key Attributes.
5IMF, “The Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions—Progress to Date and Next Steps”
(2012), 9.
6FSB, “Ten Years On—Taking Stock of Post‐crisis Resolution Reforms: Sixth Report on the Implementation of Resolu-
tion Reforms” (2017).
7G‐SIB home jurisdictions are Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the UK and the US. Regarding the 2017 G‐SIB list, see FSB, “FSB Publishes 2017 G‐SIB List” (21 November 2017),
available at: <http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb‐publishes‐2017‐g‐sib‐list/>.
GUO 3bank resolution regimes broadly in line with the KAs.8 Examples are the European legislation
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)9 and the Single Resolution Mechanism
Regulation (SRMR),10 and the U.S. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd–Frank Act).11 Reforms are underway in many other jurisdictions.12 As a member
of the FSB and the home jurisdiction to four G‐SIBs,13 China is also taking steps to formulate
a new Commercial Bank Bankruptcy Risk Resolution Regulation (the Bank Resolution Regula-
tion) as a supplement to the current bank insolvency regime.14
The cross‐border issue is one of the main problems unaddressed in the field of the new bank
resolution regime, both in China and across the world.15 This paper thus intends to examine the
cross‐border issues in the upcoming Chinese Bank Resolution Regulation. Chinese banks are
now actively involved in international businesses. As of end‐2015, 22 Chinese banks set up
1,298 outlets in 59 jurisdictions, including 213 subsidiaries, first tier branches, and representa-
tive offices.16 In terms of foreign investors, since the accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and the recent establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is in an accel-
erated process of opening up its financial market to foreign investors.17 It is expected that both
cross‐border bank operations and failures would increase in China, and the discussion of cross‐
border bank insolvency and resolution would benefit both China and its counterparties.8Among the FSB jurisdictions, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the
US have implemented the KAs. FSB, “Ten Years On—Taking Stock of Post‐Crisis Resolution Reforms” (n 6), 25–26.
9Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 15, 2014 establishing a framework for the
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/
EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ
L 173/190.
10Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 15, 2014, establishing uniform
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework
of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L
225/1.
11Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, 12 Stat. 1376 (2010).
12These jurisdictions are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Sandi Arabia, Sin-
gapore, South Africa and Turkey. FSB, “Ten Years On—Taking Stock of Post‐Crisis Resolution Reforms” (n 6), 18.
13Among the 30 G‐SIBs, 4 are Chinese banks, that is, Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).
14In accordance with the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) Announcement on May 9, 2017, the Commer-
cial Bank Bankruptcy Risk Resolution Regulation (商业银行破产风险处置条例) is in the drafting process. See CBRC
Office, “Announcement on the 2017 Legislative Plan” (May 9, 2017), available at <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/
home/docView/2017D188DE4B4FBABA4EE1F3A3519899.html>. The CBRC has merged with the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) as the new China Banking and Insurance Commission (CBIRC) since March 2018.
See “State Council Institutional Reform Plan (国务院机构改革方案)” The State Council (March 17, 2018), available at:
<http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018‐03/17/content_5275116.htm>.
15FSB (n 6), 1; see also Shuai Guo, “Cross‐border Resolution of Financial Institutions: Perspectives from International
Insolvency Law,” paper submitted for the International Insolvency Institute Prize 2018, available at:<https://www.
iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/Submission%20for%20the%20III%20Prize%20in%20International%20Insolvency%
20Studies%202018_Shuai%20Guo.pdf>.
16CBRC 2015 Annual Report, 46.
17In November 2017, China announced plans to ease limits on foreign ownership of financial services groups. See
Gabriel Wildau and Hudson Lockett, “China Pledges to Open Finance Sector to More Foreign Ownership” (Financial
Times, November 10, 2017), available at <https://www.ft.com/content/d4a85422‐c5d5‐11e7‐b2bb‐322b2cb39656>.
4 GUOSection 2 compares the concept of corporate insolvency, bank insolvency, and bank resolu-
tion and examines the relevant legislation in China. Section 3 focuses on the cross‐border pro-
visions in the Chinese insolvency law as well as relevant legal practices, forming the general
framework for the follow‐up discussion. Section 4 analyses the outgoing effects of Chinese bank
resolution measures and proposes that contractual approaches could be a possible solution for
effectuating resolution measures abroad. With this regard, the bail‐in tool and temporary stay
on early termination powers are addressed. Section 5 discusses the foreign bank resolution mea-
sures' effect in China, through the recognition and enforcement mechanism. Attention is paid to
the latest development in the Chinese legal community and special features of bank resolution
measures. Section 6 draws a conclusion.2 | CORPORATE INSOLVENCY, BANK INSOLVENCY, AND
BANK RESOLUTION IN CHINA
Since the promulgation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) in 2006,18 China entered
into a new phase of restructuring and liquidating financially difficult enterprises. It is
acknowledged that the EBL does “widely comply with accepted international standards and
provisions found in modern insolvency codes of other jurisdictions.”19 In the EBL, three main
proceedings are regulated: reorganisation,20 composition,21 and liquidation.22 However, with
regard to cross‐border insolvency issues, only Article 5 provides certain guidance without
incorporating the UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross‐border Insolvency (UNCITRAL
Model Law).23
Financial institutions that are specifically mentioned in a separate provision in the EBL shall
be subject to special treatments.24 First, financial regulatory and supervisory authorities can18The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国企业破产法) was first promulgated
on December 2, 1986, and came into force on November 1, 1988. It was later amended on August 27, 2006, and the revi-
sion came into force on June 1, 2007. It is worth noting that the 1986 Law was promulgated during a drastic economic
transition period in China and the Law only applied to state‐owned enterprises and missed many details under the mod-
ern insolvency legal regime. So practically the current insolvency legal framework in China was established by the 2006
Law.
19Mike Falke, “China's New Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy: A Story with a Happy End?” (2007) 16 International Insol-
vency Review 63. See also recent comments Shaowei Lin, “The Empirical Studies of China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law:
Problems and Improvements” (2018) 27 International Insolvency Review 77.
20Chapter 8, Articles 70–94, EBL.
21Ibid., Chapter 9, Articles 95–106.
22Ibid., Chapter 10, Articles 107–124.
23Qingxiu Bu, “China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL 2006): Cross‐border Perspectives” (2009) 18 International Insol-
vency Review 187; Guangjian Tu and Xiaolin Li, “The Chinese Approach Toward Cross‐Border Bankruptcy Proceedings:
One Progressive Step Ahead” (2015) 24 International Insolvency Review 57; Rebecca Parry and Nan Gao, “The Future
Direction of China's Cross‐border Insolvency Laws, Related Issues and Potential Problems” (2018) 27 International Insol-
vency Review 5.
24Article 134, EBL. For the comprehensive introduction of current legal instruments for Chinese bank insolvency, see
Qingjiang Kong, New Bank Insolvency Law for China and Europe Volume 1: China (Eleven International Publishing,
2017). See also Book Review of the above by Su Jieche and Casey Watters in (2018) 27 International Insolvency Review
135.
GUO 5request the courts to commence the reorganisation and liquidation proceedings.25 This is differ-
ent from the normal corporate insolvency proceedings where only the debtors or the creditors
can make such a request.
Second, additional administrative powers are conferred on these authorities, including
assumption of control and trusteeship. In particular, the Commercial Bank Law (CBL)26 and
the Regulation of and Supervision over the Bank Industry Law (RSBIL)27 provide special rules
on assumption of control. The CBL stipulates that the banking regulatory authority under the
State Council, that is, the CBIRC, may assume control over a commercial bank when it has suf-
fered or will possibly suffer, credit crisis, thereby seriously affecting the interests of the deposi-
tors.28 The RSBIL also contains similar provisions.29 Assumption of control is classified by the
IMF as one of the resolution powers.30 The new Bank Resolution Regulation in the drafting pro-
cess is expected to be in line with the Key Attributes and to empower the Chinese authorities to
take additional resolution powers including resolution tools and supportive measures.
Another important legislation regarding bank insolvency in China is the 2015 Deposit Insur-
ance Regulation (DIR).31 This regulation aims to establish the deposit insurance system in
China and to protect the interests of depositors as well as to prevent financial risks and maintain
financial stability.32 Covered banks are supposed to participate in the deposit insurance scheme
which provides for depositors at most RMB 500,000 repayment in case of bank failures.33 The
DIR adopts a territorial approach and only covers Chinese domestic banks and excludes foreign
branches of Chinese banks and Chinese branches of foreign banks.34 Under the DIR, only
domestic issues are regulated without further indication on cross‐border issues.
Bank insolvency and bank resolution should be considered as special rules under the general
corporate insolvency law framework. From the perspective of legislation hierarchy, the EBL is a25Chinese financial regulatory and supervisory authorities were previously called “one bank, three commissions” (一行
三会), that is, the central bank—the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the CBRC, the China Securities Regu-
latory Commission (CSRC) and the CIRC. Regarding these authorities, See H Huang,“Institutional Struc-
ture of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis” (2010) 10 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 219. As explained above (n 14), the new CBIRC has replaced the previous CBRC
and CIRC.
26The Commercial Bank Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国商业银行法) was first promulgated on
May 10, 1995, and came into force on July 1, 1995. It was later amended on December 27, 2003, and August 29, 2015, and
the lasted version came into force on October 1, 2015. However, the 2015 version only has two changes compared to that
of 2003, one is Item (2), Paragraph 1 of Article 39, that is, “the ratio of the outstanding of loans to the outstanding of
deposits may not exceed 75 percent” shall be deleted; and the other is the “ratio of deposits to loans” in the Item (3)
of Article 75 shall be deleted. This new amendment is mainly to reduce regulation on the ratio of deposits to loans in
order to stimulate banks' businesses. As such, the 2015 Law is not quite different from 2003 Law.
27The Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国
银行业监督管理法) was first promulgated on December 27, 2003, and came into effect on February 1, 2004.
It was later amended on October 31, 2006 and came into effect on January 1, 2007.
28Article 64, CBL.
29Article 38, RSBIL.
30See above (n 5) and accompanying text.
31The Deposit Insurance Regulation (存款保险条例) was promulgated on February 17, 2015, and came into effect on
May 1, 2015. See Kong (n 24), Chapter 9.
32Article 1, DIR.
33Ibid., Article 5.
34Ibid., Article 2.
6 GUOgeneral law governing all the insolvency cases. The EBL, the CBL, and the RSBIL are laws
approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), the legislative
body in China. The bank insolvency provisions in the CBL and the RSBIL are special rules sub-
ject to the EBL. Also, the EBL was formulated after the enactment of the CBL and the RSBIL;
thus, the new EBL shall prevail.35 The Bank Resolution Regulation as well as the DIR are reg-
ulations formulated by the government and should be subordinated to the laws. The full name
of the Bank Resolution Regulations is the Commercial Bank Bankruptcy Risk Resolution Reg-
ulation.36 As indicated by the words “Bankruptcy Risk,” the Chinese authorities would treat this
regulation as a special rule to the general insolvency legal framework.
Given the administrative nature of the new bank resolution regime, attention should be paid
with regard to the difference between resolution and other judicial insolvency proceedings.
However, the UNCITRAL Model Law clearly states that insolvency proceedings refer to both
collective judicial or administrative proceedings.37 Similarly, “court” in UNCITRAL Model
Law covers both judicial and other authorities.38 In such sense, the administrative nature of res-
olution does not exclude resolution from the general scope of insolvency. For instance, the
European legislator treats resolution as one type of “reorganisation” measures.39 In addition,
a U.S. court also confirmed that the administrative winding‐up proceedings can still apply the
traditional corporate insolvency law.40
In short, the special bank resolution regime would still be subject to the Chinese EBL, includ-
ing the cross‐border provisions embedded in Article 5. The cross‐border issues have been a cen-
tre topic among the Chinese insolvency lawyers, for both general corporate insolvency and the
special bank insolvency.41 However, the previous research does not take into account the recent
development of bank resolution law. Some ambiguity needs to be clarified about those special
resolution measures. This paper thus aims to fill the gap and focuses on the cross‐border issues
in the upcoming Chinese Bank Resolution Regulation. It should be noted that the following dis-
cussion does not go beyond the realm of Article 5 of the EBL.3 | RESTRICTED UNIVERSALISM IN THE CHINESE
INSOLVENCY LAW3.1 | Article 5 of the EBL
Article 5 is the major provision in the EBL that provides the general framework for cross‐border
insolvency in China. As explained above, this article also governs the future cross‐border bank
resolution cases. Its two paragraphs address two issues respectively: what is the extraterritorial35Article 134(2), EBL: the State Council may formulate implementation rules for financial institutions insolvency in
accordance with the EBL.
36See above (n 14).
37Article 2(a), UNCITRAL Model Law.
38Ibid., Article 2(e).
39Article 117, BRRD.
40In re Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd., 538 B.R. 692 (D. Del. 2015), 698.
41See, particularly, Jingxia Shi, Studies on Legal Issues in Cross‐border Insolvency [跨国破产的法律问题研究] (Wuhan
University Press, 1999); A. Li, Study on Legal Issues of Cross‐border Insolvency of Commercial Banks [商业银行跨境破
产法律问题研究] (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2012).
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sideredOnce the procedure for bankruptcy is initiated according to this Law, it shall come into
effect in respect of the debtor's property outside of the territory of the People's Republic
of China.
Where a legally effective judgment or ruling made on a bankruptcy case by a court of
another country involves a debtor's property within the territory of the People's
Republic of China and the said court applies with or requests the people's court to
recognise and enforce it, the people's court shall, according to the relevant
international treaties that China has concluded or acceded to or on the basis of the
principle of reciprocity, conduct examination thereof and, when believing that the
said judgment or ruling does not violate the basic principles of the laws of the
People's Republic of China, does not jeopardise the sovereignty and security of the
State or public interests, does not undermine the legitimate rights and interests of
the creditors within the territory of the People's Republic of China, decide to
recognise and enforce the judgement or ruling.42Regarding the scope of effects of one jurisdiction's insolvency proceedings, there are two
competing principles: universalism and territorialism. The former refers to the worldwide effect
of an insolvency proceeding, and the latter means that the effect of an insolvency proceeding is
limited to the territory of the jurisdiction where the insolvency proceeding is commenced.43 A
distinction is made regarding the outgoing effect and incoming effect, addressing the overseas
effects of domestic proceedings and domestic effects of foreign proceedings respectively.44 Arti-
cle 5 reflects both outgoing universalism and incoming universalism.
On the one hand, regarding the outgoing effect of Chinese domestic insolvency proceedings,
China holds the position that the assets located outside China are still under the control of
domestic insolvency proceedings.45 However, the actual implementation of Chinese insolvency
proceedings would depend on the counterparts' attitudes.
On the other hand, China also allows foreign insolvency proceedings to be effective in China
but with strict conditions. This approach is referred to in this paper as restricted universalism.46e 5, EBL.
ding universalism and territorialism, see, for example, Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law Part I: Global
tives on Cross‐Border Insolvency Law (4th edn; Kluwer, 2015), paragraph 10009 ff; Gabriel Moss QC, Bob Wessels
tthias Haentjens, “Principles for Cross‐border Financial Institution Insolvencies” in Gabriel Moss QC, Bob
and Matthias Haentjens (eds), EU Banking and Insurance Insolvency (OUP, 2017), paragraph 2.03 ff.
distinguishes the difference between outgoing universalism and incoming universalism: the former refers to the
that “the insolvency proceedings opened by its official bodies are exclusive and have worldwide effect”; while
er means “a state accepts the effects of foreign proceedings on its own territory.” See Reinhard Bork, Principles
s‐border Insolvency Law (Intersentia, 2017), 26–27.
utgoing universalism approach is widely accepted among the scholar. See Bu (n 23); Emily Lee and Karen Ho,
's New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law—A Great Leap Forward, but Just How Far?” (2010) 19 International Insol-
eview 145; Parry (n 23).
i (n 41), 311. Some would refer to this approach as territorialism. See Tu (n 23), 58. However, it is pointed out in
er that China does not prohibit the effectiveness of foreign insolvency proceedings, but only puts restrictions on
sing such effectiveness. Thus, it is not appropriate to treat this as a territorialism approach. Parry and Gao con-
this as a modified universalism approach. See Parry and Gao (n 23), 12.
8 GUOIn accordance with this article, the premises for recognition and enforcement is either interna-
tional agreements or reciprocity. Only when one of the two conditions is met can a foreign
insolvency proceeding be recognised. However, there is an additional safeguard mechanism,
that is, public policy exception, which could be the basis for denial of recognition and enforce-
ment. The public policy exception consists of two circumstances: one is that the foreign proceed-
ings violate the basic principles of the laws of China, or jeopardise the sovereignty and security
of the State or public interest, and the other one is that the proceedings undermine the legiti-
mate rights and interests of the creditors within China.
It is also noted that this provision does not prescribe jurisdiction issues. However, article 3 of
the EBL stipulates that the People's Court of the place where the debtor is domiciled shall have
jurisdiction over the case.47 This provision is targeted at the jurisdiction issue of Chinese domes-
tic insolvency cases.48 But it could be inferred that when a debtor's domicile is located in
another jurisdiction, an insolvency proceeding against this debtor should be commenced in
the foreign jurisdiction.49 In accordance with the General Rules on the Civil Law of the People's
Republic of China (GRCL),50 a legal person's domicile is its main office location.51 China has
not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law and it is assumed that China only allows one insol-
vency proceeding where the debtor's domicile is located.523.2 | Cross‐border insolvency cases
This section describes several cases to illustrate China's attitude towards cross‐border insolvency
cases. There are two cross‐border bank insolvency cases in China that worth mentioning. One is
the insolvency of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), and the other one is
the insolvency of the Lehman Brothers.
The BCCI Group collapsed in 1991, and provisional liquidation proceedings were com-
menced in Luxembourg and England in July 1991 and in the Cayman Islands at about the same
time.53 In the meanwhile, the Bank of China Shenzhen Branch initiated an insolvency proceed-
ing against the BCCI Shenzhen Branch in Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court. The court
ruled that foreign insolvency proceedings do not have binding effect in China and continued
to rule that domestic assets, in total USD 20 million, should be distributed among domestic
creditors.54 This is a case before the enactment of the EBL, and it indicates a strong territorial
approach. But because it was a long time ago, it cannot fully represent the attitudes of Chinese
courts nowadays.47Article 3, EBL.
48Li (n 41), 310–311.
49See Bu (n 23), 202–203. Li questions the applicability of Article 3 on cross‐border cases. See Li (n 41), 311.
50The General Rules on the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国民法总则) was promulgated on
March 15, 2017, and came into effect on October 1, 2017.
51Article 63, GRCL.
52It is proposed though by scholars that the UNCITRAL Model Law should be incorporated into the Chinese law. See
Jingxia Shi, “Chinese Cross‐border Insolvencies: Current Issues and Future Developments” (2001) 10 International Insol-
vency Review 33; Bu (n 23); Lee and Ho (n 45).
53See Sandy Shandro, “Judicial Co‐operation in Cross‐border Insolvency—The English Court Takes a Step Backwards in
BCCI (No. 10)” (1998) 7 International Insolvency Review 63.
54Due to the restricted access and limited online resources, the original judgment cannot be found. However, Chinese
scholars have described this case, see, for example, Shi (n 52), 39–40.
GUO 9A more recent case was Hua An Funds v. Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE) in
2008.55 Hua An International Balanced Funds was launched in 2006 under China's Qualified
Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme by Hua An Funds Management Co. and invested
in structured notes designed by the Lehman Brothers. Hua An brought the Lehman Brothers to
the Shanghai High People's court in September 2008 after Lehman's collapse. After 3 years, in
2011, Lehman Brothers agreed to pay Hua An USD 44.89 million in compensation. The legal
challenge was, at that time, Lehman Brothers had already initiated insolvency proceedings in
the United Kingdom, and the Lehman Brothers claimed that Hua An Fund should participate
in the global insolvency proceedings and the court cannot take action. However, the court
decided that the insolvency proceedings in the United Kingdom cannot be recognised in China
due to two considerations. One is that there is no international agreement between the United
Kingdom and China that involves international insolvency issues; the other one is there was no
precedent that the United Kingdom had recognised China's insolvency proceedings thus there
was no legal basis for reciprocity.56 It can be drawn from this case that, even in 2011, China still
had a strong intention to protect the assets of its own citizens and enterprises. And if there is no
agreement or precedent of recognition of Chinese judgments in another jurisdiction, it is
unlikely that a Chinese court would recognise bank insolvency proceedings from that
jurisdiction.
However, the above two cases do not demonstrate that China would not recognise foreign
insolvency proceedings. Conversely, as early as 2000 in the B&T case in Foshan, Guangdong
Province, a Chinese court had recognised foreign insolvency proceedings for the first time.57
In this case, Foshan Intermediate People's Court decided to recognise an Italian insolvency pro-
ceeding because there is a treaty on judicial assistance in civil matters between the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of Italy.58 Finally, the Italian company obtained its 98%
shares in Nanhai Nassetti Pioneer Ceramic Machinery Co. Ltd of USD 5.39 million.
Another case indirectly involving cross‐border insolvency is the Sino‐Environment Technology
Group Limited, Singapore v Thumb Env‐Tech Group (Fujian) Co., Ltd case.59 This is a dispute
mainly regarding shareholder capital contribution. The Singapore company was the shareholder
of the Chinese Fujian Company, and it did not fulfil the capital contribution obligation and was
brought to the court by the Chinese company. During the trial, the Singapore company went into
administration, one type of insolvency proceedings in Singapore, and the issue was raised whether
the administrator appointed by the Singapore court can act as the representative of the Singapore
company in China. Instead of addressing the recognition issue, the SupremeCourt invokedArticle
14 of the Law on Application of Law for Foreign Related Civil Relationships of the People's55[2008] Hu Gao Min Si (Shang) Chu Zi No.6 Conciliation Statement. The document is confidential.
56Since the Conciliation Statement is confidential, the opinion stated here is a reflection of a judge from the Shanghai
High People's Court, who heard the Lehman Brothers case. See Fengxiang Zhang, “The Needs for Improvement of Rel-
evant Laws Arising from the Financial Derivative Products Cooperative Disputes between Hua An Funds and Lehman
Brothers International Europe” (2012), available at: <http://old.ccmt.org.cn/showexplore.php?id=4148>. See also Xinyi
Gong, “To Recognise or Not to Recognise? Comparative Study of Lehman Brothers Cases in Mainland China and Tai-
wan” (2013) 10 International Corporate Rescue 240.
57(2000) Fo Zhong Fa Jing Chu Zi No.663 Civil Decisions. However, the original document cannot be found online.
58For more information about the case, see Jianhong Liu, “A Case on Application for Recognition and Enforcement of
Italian Court Ruling on Bankruptcy” (2003) China Law 32. The author is a judge at Foshan Intermediate People's Court.
59(2014) Min Si Zhong Zi No 20 Civil Ruling. See also comments Tu (n 23).
10 GUORepublic of China (LAL)60 and decided that the civil rights and capacity of the administrator and
liquidator should be governed by the law of the place where the debtor is registered.
As can be seen from the cases, in terms of incoming recognition and enforcement, Chinese
courts follow the restricted conditions specified in Article 5 to examine the request of foreign
representatives. If there is no treaty exists, and there is no legal basis for reciprocity, it is
unlikely that a Chinese court will recognise or enforce a foreign insolvency proceeding. How-
ever, a foreign administrator, without touching upon the recognition and enforcement issue,
may act as the representative of the foreign debtor and exercise the power in China accordingly.4 | OUTGOING EFFECTS OF CHINESE BANK RESOLUTION
MEASURES
4.1 | Possible responses from other jurisdictions
China takes the outgoing universalism approach with regard to its insolvency proceedings'
effects abroad. However, as a matter of fact, the ultimate decision power is in the hands of
the counterpart jurisdictions, despite that the Chinese authorities would like to extend their
powers to the Chinese debtor's foreign assets. With regard to bank resolution measures, the
counterparties may be more cautious because public interest is involved in the resolution cases.
For example, in the EU, one of the largest Chinese counterparts, the BRRD was enacted and
has been transposed into national laws.61 Title VI of the BRRD regulates “relations with third
countries,” and the Union branch is subject to the foreign jurisdiction, unless “a Union branch
is not subject to any third‐country resolution proceedings or that is subject to third‐country pro-
ceedings and one of the circumstances referred to in Article 95 applies.” Article 95 lists five cir-
cumstances where the EU resolution authorities can refuse to recognise or enforce third‐country
resolution proceedings. These circumstances are generally categorised as public policy excep-
tions, including the following:
(a). that the third‐country resolution proceedings would have adverse effects on financial sta-
bility in the Member State in which the resolution authority is based or that the proceed-
ings would have adverse effects on financial stability in another Member State;
(b). that independent resolution action under Article 96 in relation to a Union branch is nec-
essary to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives;
(c). that creditors, including in particular depositors located or payable in a Member State,
would not receive the same treatment as third‐country creditors and depositors with sim-
ilar legal rights under the third‐country home resolution proceedings;
(d). that recognition or enforcement of the third‐country resolution proceedings would have
material fiscal implications for the Member State; or
(e). that the effects of such recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the national
law.6260The Law on Application of Law for Foreign Related Civil Relationships of the People's Republic of China was promul-
gated on October 28, 2010, and came into effect on April 1, 2011. Article 14 stipulates that the internal affairs of a legal
person and its branch such as legal rights, legal capacity, internal organisations, rights and obligations of shareholders
shall be governed by the law of the place where such an entity is registered.
61Article 130, BRRD Transposition.
62Article 95, BRRD.
GUO 11Based on this provision, the EU authorities may refuse to recognise and enforce Chinese res-
olution measures due to the consideration of these circumstances even if Chinese authorities
determine that the resolution measures should have worldwide effect. In other words, as long
as national authorities can take a unilateral discretionary decision on whether or not to recog-
nise foreign resolution measures, there must be legal uncertainty regarding effectuating bank
resolution measures abroad.4.2 | Contractual approaches
Unless an international agreement has entered into effect or a similar statutory regime is in
place, the outgoing effects of Chinse bank resolution measures would be in great doubt. A pos-
sible solution to help achieve the goal of the cross‐border effectiveness of resolution actions is to
apply the contractual approach, requiring the Chinese financial institutions to add a contractual
recognition clause in the financial instruments creating liabilities for those institutions. As
required by the FSB, authorities should require, or provide incentives for, firms to adopt con-
tractual approaches.63 Although concerns have been expressed by various institutions about
the enforceability issues such as lack of support from statutory law and possible inconsistency
with public policy,64 contractual approaches can be a possible interim solution for the effective-
ness of cross‐border resolution actions. It is acknowledged by Schwarcz et al. that “[c]ontractual
approaches cannot fill the gap [where no statutory recognition framework is in place], but to a
limited extent they can help to reinforce legal certainty and predictability assent a statutory
framework.”65 The following two sections specifically illustrate two examples: contractual
bail‐in and contractual temporary stay, which were proposed by the FSB66 and has been applied
in several model contracts.4.2.1 | Contractual bail‐in
The bail‐in tool is to write down equity or other instruments of ownership, unsecured and unin-
sured creditor claims; to convert all or parts of unsecured and uninsured creditor claims into
equity or other instruments of ownership.67 Bail‐in is a restructuring process, which requires
the shareholders and creditors to absorb the losses first, thus reducing the possibility of using
taxpayers' money to bail out large banks.68 The statutory bail‐in tool has been incorporated into
the national legislation, such as the BRRD.6963FSB, “Principles for Cross‐border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions” (November 3, 2015).
64Public responses can be viewed on the FSB website. See FSB, “Public responses to the September 2015 consultative
document ‘Cross‐border Recognition of Resolution Actions’” (December 12, 2014), available at: <http://www.fsb.org/
2014/12/public‐responses‐to‐the‐september‐2014‐consultative‐document‐cross‐border‐recognition‐of‐resolution‐actions/
>.
65Steven Schwarcz et al., “Comments on the September 29, 2014 FSB Consultative Document, ‘Cross‐Border Recognition
of Resolution Action’” (2014) Centre for International Governance Innovation CIGI Paper No 51.
66FSB (n 63), 7–8.
67KA 3.5.
68See, for example, Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, “Critical Reflections on Bank Bail‐ins” (2015) 1 Journal of
Financial Regulation 3; Karl‐Philipp Wojcik, “Bail‐in in the Banking Union” (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 9.
69Articles 43–58, BRRD. In the BRRD, bail‐in only refers to write down or convert creditors' claims.
12 GUOThe contractual bail‐in, as provided in Article 55 of the BRRD, has been implemented in the
EU starting from January 1, 2016.70 Institutions in the EU are required to include a contractual
term in certain agreements that creditors agree to be bound by the bail‐in tool initiated by the
European resolution authorities; these agreements are those creating liabilities for European
institutions but governed by the law a third country other than the EU Member States.71 Despite
there is a possibility that the foreign supervisor may forbid this kind of contract term,72 the con-
tractual approach can somehow provide a certain guarantee when the foreign law does not have
explicit provisions over this issue. The International Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA)
published the Bail‐in Article 55 BRRD Protocol,73 functioning as a guide for international deriv-
ative traders to incorporate the contractual bail‐in provision.
On the Chinese bond market there is a similar instrument, the so‐called “write‐down Tier 2
capital instruments.”74 As required by the contractual terms, creditors who purchase the bonds
should agree to be bound by the write‐down or conversion measures taken by the authorities.
The first of this kind of bond was issued by Tianjin Bin Hai Nong Shang Bank on July 25,
2013.75 The actual purpose of issuing such bond is to meet the capital requirements. In response
to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced new
global banking supervision standards, the Basel III.76 Accordingly, in order to comply with
the Basel standard, China further issued the Measures for the Management of Capitals of Com-
mercial Banks (Provisional; the Capital Rules)77 and requires the banks to hold sufficient funds.
The issuance of these capital instruments bonds facilitates the accumulation of capitals. It
should be noted that these Chinese T2 instruments differ from those complied with Article 55
of the BRRD. First, only capital instruments are subject to write‐down and conversion in China,
but the EU bail‐in is applied to other subordinated or senior debts. Second, the T2 capital instru-
ments are governed by the Chinese law whereas the contractual bail‐in approach in BRRD is70Article 130, BRRD Transposition.
71Article 55, BRRD.
72See Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal
amending: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms; Direc-
tive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
investment firms; Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions
and investment firms; Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 15, 2014,
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms
in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund, SWD/2016/0377 final/2–2016/0360
(COD).
73ISDA 2016 Bail‐in Article 55 BRRD Protocol (Dutch/French/German/Irish/Italian/Luxembourg/Spanish/UK entity‐in‐
resolution version). A second version was updated in 2017. ISDA, “ISDA Publishes Second Bail‐in Article 55 BRRD Pro-
tocol” (April 19, 2017), available at <https://www.isda.org/a/dpDDE/article‐55‐protocol‐2‐press‐release‐final.pdf> .
74See the China Bond website at <http://www.chinabond.com.cn/>. “Write‐down Tier 2 capital instruments” can be
viewed by selecting bond type “Tier 2 capital instruments.”
75More information is available on the China Bond website at <http://www.chinabond.com.cn/jsp/include/EJB/
queryResult.jsp?queryType=0&sType=2&zqdm=&zqjc=&zqxz=34&eYear2=0000>.
76BCBS, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for more Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” (rev June 2011);
BCBS, “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” (January 2013); BCBS, “Net Stable Funding Ratio” (October 2014); BCBS, “Basel
III: Finalising Post‐crisis Reforms” (December 2017).
77The Measures for the Management of Capitals of Commercial Banks (商业银行资本管理办法(试行)) was promulgated
on June 7, 2012, and came into effect on January 1, 2013. In accordance with this regulation, the total amount of the
capital of a commercial bank consists of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital, Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital and Tier
2 (T2) capital.
GUO 13supposed to ensure the effectiveness of foreign‐law governed contracts. In such sense, China
actually does not have a contractual bail‐in tool. However, because the contractual term might
be similar, it is feasible and realisable to propose that such contractual approach should be
incorporated into the upcoming Chinese Bank Resolution Regulation in terms of foreign law
governed instruments, with the aim to enhance the overseas effectiveness of Chinese bail‐in
measures.4.2.2 | Contractual temporary stay on early termination rights
Early termination rights, such as the close‐out netting,78 is a commonly used tool to protect the
creditors when the debtors enter into insolvency. However, the latest crisis witnessed the disrup-
tive effects of exercising these early termination rights, and thus, the FSB recommends that the
resolution authorities should be able to temporarily stay these early termination rights to main-
tain the continuity of the critical functions of the financial institutions in distress.79
In the absence of an appropriate statutory framework for recognition, it is likely that a
domestic court would not recognise a temporary stay on the domestic law‐governed contract
exercised by the foreign authorities. Thus, a contractual term recognising such powers of foreign
authorities would enhance the foreign effectiveness of temporary stay on early termination
rights. The ISDA has also published the ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol80 as a
guide for incorporating contractual temporary stay terms, similar to the Bail‐in Protocol.
According to the FSB report, all the G‐SIBs except for Chinese ones have adopted the ISDA
2015 Universal Protocol.81
Concerns may arise with regard to the attitude towards early termination rights and tempo-
rary stay in China. Fortunately, it has already been confirmed by the CBRC that close out net-
ting is legitimate in China, and the CBRC is in the project studying the possibility of conducting
contractual temporary stay in the upcoming bank resolution regime.82 Though the actual imple-
mentation plan is still unclear, it is expected that contractual temporary stay on early termina-
tion rights would be in existence in the upcoming Chinese Bank Resolution Regulation.78Close‐out netting is the cancellation of a series of open executory contracts between parties, for example, for a sale of
goods or foreign exchange or investments, on the default of the counterparty and set‐off of the resulting gains and losses.
Close‐out netting requires two steps on a counterparty default: cancellation of the unperformed contracts, and then set‐
off the gains and losses on each contract, so as to produce a single net balance owing one way or the other. See Philip
Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), paragraph 14–04.
79KA 4.3. See Francisco Garcimartín and Maria Isabel Saez, “Set‐off, Netting and Close‐out Netting” in Haentjens and
Wessels (eds) (n 2). KA 4.3 also specifies that a temporary stay should “be strictly limited in time (for example, for a
period not exceeding 2 business days)”; should “be subject to adequate safeguards that protect the integrity of financial
contracts and provide certainty to counterparties”; and should “not affect the exercise of early termination rights of a
counterparty that are not related to entry into resolution or the exercise of the relevant resolution power (for example,
failure to make a payment, or deliver or return collateral on a due date) occurring before, during or after the period of
the stay.”
80ISDA, “ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol” (November 4, 2015).
81FSB (n 6), 13.
82CBRC, Responses to the Fifth Meeting of the Twelfth NPC Recommendation No 2691 [对十二届全国人大五次会议第
2691号建议答复的函], Yin Jian Shen Han [2017] No 105.
14 GUO5 | INCOMING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN BANK RESOLUTION
MEASURES IN CHINA
In contrast with the previous section, this section focuses on the effectiveness of foreign bank
resolution measures in China. Because Article 5 of the EBL only discusses the recognition
and enforcement issue, this section also only examines the conditions for recognition and
enforcement: international agreement, reciprocity, and public policy exception.5.1 | International agreement
It is possible that a Chinese authority would recognise the foreign bank resolution measures'
effects in China in accordance with international agreements. In addition to the traditional judi-
cial assistance treaty, in the banking sector, there are many other forms of agreements, such as
institution‐specific cross‐border cooperation agreements (CoAgs), Memorandum of Understand-
ings (MOUs), and protocol.
The CoAgs was proposed in the FSB Key Attributes as a coping mechanism specifically
targeted at Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G‐SIFIs).83 In these agree-
ments, the roles and responsibilities of the authorities should be defined, and home and host
authorities' commitments with regard to cooperation shall also be specified.84 As of end‐2015,
the CoAgs were drafted for ICBC, ABC, and BOC in China, except for CCB.85
MOU is another common agreement signed between the home and host authorities regard-
ing banking sector supervision cooperation. An example is the MOU reached by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Bank of England (BOE) on resolution issues.86
The CBRC has been actively involved in the international cooperation, and as of July 2017,
the CBRC has entered into similar agreements with authorities in 68 foreign jurisdictions.87
Despite that these agreements do not cover resolution matters, they could possibly provide
the legal basis for further and future cooperation between Chinese and foreign authorities.
The protocol instrument was used in the Lehman Brothers insolvency proceedings, as the
“Cross‐border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies” (The Lehman
Protocol).88 China, however, was not a party to the Lehman Brothers Protocol, but it does not
rule out the possibility that China would become a party to such kind of protocols in the future.
It should be noted that the above mentioned international agreements are not binding in
nature.89 However, it is possible that they could serve as the legal basis for recognising and83KA 9.
84Key Attributes Appendix I‐annex 2: Essential Elements of Institution‐specific Cross‐border Cooperation Agreements.
85CBRC 2015 Annual Report, 125.
86Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to
the Resolution of Insured Depository Institutions with Cross‐border Operations in the United Kingdom and the United
States, January 10, 2010. Also, see the MOU reached by the FDIC and the BOE titled Resolving Globally Active, System-
ically Important, Financial Institutions (2012).
87CBRC, “List of Memorandum of Understandings on Bilateral Supervision Cooperation and Statement of Supervision
Cooperation signed by the CBRC” (September 19, 2017), available at <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/
docView/71441D9239DD49CAB801DBACDC74A258.html>.
88See the execution copy, available at:<https://www.insol.org/Fellowship%202010/Session%209/Lehman%20protocol%
20executed.pdf>.
89KA 9; Article 2, FDIC‐BOE MOU 2010, paragraph 5; Term 1.2, Lehman Protocol. See Guo (n 15), 25–26.
GUO 15enforcing foreign resolution measures, given that the Chinese authorities may still choose to
accept their effectiveness.5.2 | Reciprocity
In China, reciprocity is still a mandatory requirement for recognition and enforcement except
for the circumstances of existing international agreements.90 China even imposes a “real reci-
procity” requirement,91 that is, a foreign jurisdiction has to recognise and enforce a Chinese
judgment before, then subsequently it is possible that a Chinese court would recognise and
enforce a judgment from that jurisdiction.
In spite of being prescribed in the laws, the reciprocity principle was seldom invoked by the
courts. The recent judgment made by the Nanjing Intermediate People's Court in 2016,92 which
recognised a Singapore commercial judgment, was claimed to be the first case in which a Chi-
nese court recognised a foreign court judgment based on the principle of reciprocity in the
absence of a treaty.93 In this contract dispute case, KolmarGroupAG submitted its request to
the Nanjing Intermediate People's Court for recognising judgments made by the Singapore High
Court on October 22, 2015. There is indeed a treaty between China and Singapore on judicial
assistance in civil and commercial matters; however, mutual recognition of judicial judgments
is not covered in the scope of this treaty. But the judge on this case continued to rule that the
Singapore judgment can be recognised in China because there was a precedent of Singapore
court recognising Chinese judgments before; thus, the ruling for recognition is based on the rec-
iprocity principle, with the consideration that no public interest or national laws are violated.
In addition, the current development in the Chinese legal community has to be taken into
account as well, in particular, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI, also known as the
One Belt One Road (OBOD) Initiative when first proposed in 2013, originates from the ancient
Silk Road trading routes throughout Eurasia and aims to boost the global economy.94 Alongside
the initiative, the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China (SPC) published
eight guiding cases on July 7, 201595 and 10 guiding cases on May 15, 201796 regarding the
BRI, respectively. These cases include Przedsiębiorstwo Przemysłu Chłodniczego Fritar S.A.,90Article 5, EBL. The Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (CPL) also contains the same requirement.
See Articles 281–283, CPL.
91Wenliang Zhang, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: A Call for Special Attention to Both
the ‘Due Service Requirement’ and the ‘Principle of Reciprocity’” (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 143.
92(2016) Su 01 Xie Wai Ren No 3 Civil Ruling.
93Baker McKenzie, “First Time PRC Court Recognizes a Foreign Judgment Based on Principle of Reciprocity” (7 Febru-
ary 2017), available at <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/01/first‐time‐prc‐court‐recog-
nizes‐a‐foreign>.
94For a more detail introduction of the BRI, please see the BRI official website at <http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/>.
95SPC, “Typical Cases of the People's Court for Providing Judicial Services and Guarantee for the Belt and Road Initia-
tive” (July 7, 2017), available at <http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun‐xiangqing‐14897.html>.
96SPC, “Typical Cases for the Belt and Road Initiative II” (May 15, 2017), available at <http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun‐
xiangqing‐44722.html>.
16 GUOPoland,97 a case on recognition of foreign judgment, and the above‐mentioned Sino‐Environ-
ment Technology Group Limited, Singapore v Thumb Env‐Tech Group (Fujian) Co., Ltd., and
KolmarGroupAG case. The publication of these guiding cases reflects that Chinese courts are
more willing to deal with cross‐border disputes, be bound by international obligations, respect
foreign legal systems and treat foreign parties on an equal basis.98
In addition, the Supreme Court has emphasized in the Opinions of Providing Judicial Service
and Guarantee for Belt and Road Initiative99 that the courts may also consider to give judicial
assistance first to other parties in the foreign jurisdictions and expand the scope of international
judicial assistance. This indicates the possibility that a Chinese court may recognise foreign
insolvency proceedings without requiring that the other jurisdiction has recognised a Chinese
judgment or ruling before.5.3 | Public policy exception
There is an additional safeguard mechanism with the purpose to protect the local interests of
China, namely, public policy exception. In the Chinese EBL, public policy is more extensively
stated as “the basic principles of the PRC laws, the State sovereignty, security or public interest”
and “the legitimate rights and interests of the creditors.”100 This is a broad definition of public
policy and can be effectively invoked as an excuse to refuse the recognition and enforcement.
However, public policy exception has not been used in cross‐border insolvency cases in China.
In fact, the public policy has not been invoked even in cases requesting recognition of other civil
and commercial matters.101
For one reason, there are strict premises of previous mentioned international agreement and
reciprocity principle; thus, public policy exception is seldom needed. For another, public policy
exception should be restrictedly applied. In the Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐border Insolvency, it is provided that public policy exceptions
“should be interpreted restrictively and … is only intended to be invoked under exceptional cir-
cumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance for the enacting State.”102 As can be
seen from the choice of words here, public policy exception is narrowly interpreted, with the97(2013) Zhe Yong Min Que Zi No 1 Civil Ruling. This is a dispute between a Polish company and a Chinese company. It
is confirmed by the Ningbo Intermediate People's Court that China and Poland have entered into an Agreement on Judi-
cial Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters, and thus the court grants the recognition request on the basis of such
agreement.
98Shuai Guo, “Reflections on the Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative” (Leiden Law Blog, May 19, 2017), available at:
<http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/reflections‐on‐the‐chinese‐belt‐and‐road‐initiative>.
99Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on the People's Courts Providing Judicial Service and Guarantee for
Belt and Road Initiative, Fa Fa [2015] No.9.
100Article 5, EBL.
101See the article in March 2018, Li Liu, ‘The Reason and Rule for Recognition and Enforcement of Court Judgments
among the “One Belt and One Road” Countries “[一带一路”国家间法院判决承认与执行的理据与规则]” (2018) Journal
of Law Application 40.
102See UNCITRAL, “Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency”
(2013), paragraph 104.
GUO 17requirement of manifestly contrary to the most fundamental policies.103 Similarly, the U.S. com-
mittee on the judiciary house of representatives also pointed out that public policy exception
“has been narrowly interpreted on a consistent basis in courts around the world.”104 With
regard to Chinese opinion, the lack of judicial practices is not helpful in identifying the courts'
attitudes. However, the Chinese academic community seems to consistently confirm the narrow
application of the public policy exception and expects the courts to follow this approach in the
future cases.105
The possibility cannot be ruled out for Chinese authorities to invoke public policy to deny
recognition and enforcement in terms of cross‐border bank resolution. Special attention is paid
to two specific public policies: financial stability and protection of creditors' interest, which have
also been specifically listed by the FSB as two reasons to refuse recognition and enforcement.106
Financial stability has been widely accepted as one of the major public policies.107 It is also
acknowledged that the adoption of bank resolution is to maintain financial stability.108 Thus,
if a foreign resolution measure poses a danger to the local financial stability, it would be against
the ultimate goal of the bank resolution mechanism. Under such circumstances, financial stabil-
ity should be one of the public policy goals and can be invoked to refuse to recognise and
enforce foreign resolution measures.
Creditors' protection is a traditional topic in the insolvency law. In the cross‐border context,
special attention is paid to the equal treatment of foreign and domestic creditors. In the liquida-
tion process, there is the pari passu principle, which guarantees that the debtor's assets shall be
distributed pro rata to the creditors in the similar situations.109 Exceptions are allowed in103Similar way of interpretation is confirmed in academic works, see, for example, Scott Mund, “11 USC 1506: US Courts
Keep a Tight Rein on the Public Policy Exception, but the Potential to Undermine Internationals Cooperation in Insol-
vency Proceedings Remains” (2010) 28 Wisconsin International Law Journal 325; Michael Garza, “When Is Cross‐Border
Insolvency Recognition Manifestly Contrary to Public Policy” (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 1587.
104H‐R Rep. N. 109–31 (2005), 109.
105See, for example, X. Gao, On the Application of Public Policy in Private International Law [论国际私法上的公共政策之
运用] (University of International Business and Economics, 2005); D. Ma, A Study of the Ordre Public in Private Interna-
tional Law [国际私法中的公共秩序研究] (Wuhan University, 2010); Dan Ye, On the Public Policy in Chinese Foreign
Judicial Practice Relating to Civil and Commercial Matters (Law Press, 2012).
106FSB (n 63), 11.
107See, for example, Andrew Crockett, “Why is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy?” (1997) 82 Economic Review 5;
Charles Wyplosz, “International Financial Stability” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern (eds), Global Public
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP, 1999); Michael Patra, “Should Financial Stability Be
Assigned to Public Policy?” (2003) 38 Economic and Political Weekly 2271.
108See, for example, Martin Čihák and Erlend Nier, The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions:
The Case of the European Union (IMF Working Paper WP/09/200) (International Monetary Fund, 2009); Sven Schelo,
Bank Recovery and Resolution (Kluwer Law International, 2015); Michael Schillig, Resolution and Insolvency of Banks
and Financial Institutions (OUP, 2016); Simon Gleeson and Randall Guynn, Bank Resolution and Crisis Management:
Law and Practice (OUP, 2016).
109According to the World Bank, following distributions to secured creditors form their collateral and the payment of
claims related to the costs and expenses of administration, proceeds available for distribution should be distributed pari
passu to the remaining general unsecured creditors. See World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/
Debtor Regimes (2015). See also Fidelis Oditah, “Assets and the Treatment of Claims in Insolvency”(1992) 108 Law
Quarterly Review 459; Vanessa Finch, “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?” (1999) 62 Modern Law
Review 633.
18 GUOcertain circumstances, for instance, taxes and employees' wages, and, under bank insolvency
proceedings, depositors' deposits.110 Nevertheless, nationality does not constitute a legal exemp-
tion, and foreign creditors shall be granted with equal treatment as domestic creditors.111 Sim-
ilarly situated domestic and foreign creditors shall be in the same position when liquidating the
debtor's assets. The equal treatment not only focuses on the asset distribution and liquidation
proceeding but also extends to other creditors' rights such as commencement and participation
in the overall insolvency/restructuring proceedings.112
Similarly, during cross‐border bank resolution proceedings, equal treatment shall be granted
to all the creditors, regardless of their nationalities.113 Taking the bail‐in measure as an example,
the write‐down or conversion shall respect the hierarchy of insolvency proceedings.114 Similarly
situated creditors, both domestic and foreign, should absorb losses pro rata. In addition, there is
the no creditor worse off than in liquidation (NCWOL) principle, which guarantees the legiti-
mate interests of creditors during the bank resolution proceedings. And when a creditor is less
treated in a resolution proceeding than a normal insolvency proceeding, the creditor shall be
entitled to compensation.115 Accordingly, both domestic and foreign creditors should be entitled
to compensation afterwards. In the EBL context, if the Chinese creditors are not treated equally
during foreign resolution proceedings, it is possible to refuse to recognise or enforce relevant
foreign resolution measures on the basis of creditor protection public policy exception.6 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
China is now a major international market participant and facing a large number of cross‐bor-
der transactions, which may also involve corporate and bank insolvency issues. Attention
should be paid to the upcoming Chinse Bank Resolution Regulation regarding cross‐border
issues. In terms of the legal framework, Article 5 of the EBL is expected to remain the same
in the near future and be the governing law for cross‐border bank insolvency and resolution.
However, this article only stipulates the recognition and enforcement proceedings and other
cross‐border issues, such as jurisdiction and applicable law, are not adequately addressed. With-
out significant amendments to Article 5, cross‐border bank insolvency and bank resolution
would encounter great uncertainty in the future. Within the current regime, special features
of bank resolution should and can be taken into consideration. This paper proposes that the pre-
vious legal cases and regulatory practices of financial supervisors could add a valuable110Mokal extensively discussed the pari passu principles and the actual situations where the creditors are not equal. See
Riz Mokal, “Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 581. See also Vanessa Finch,
Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn; CUP, 2009), 599–674; Dennis Faber et al., Ranking and
Priority of Creditors (OUP, 2016). The exceptions are listed in Article 113, EBL; Article 71, CBL.
111A similar statement is confirmed by the World Bank, as “effective insolvency systems should aim to … provide for
equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors, including similarly situated foreign and domestic creditors.” See
World Bank Principles (n 109).
112UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Recommendation 1(d).
113KA 7.4.
114See the FSB Key Attribute 5.1. It is proposed by the FSB that equity should absorb losses first, and no loss should be
imposed on senior debt holders until subordinated debt (including all regulatory capital instruments) has been written‐
off entirely (whether or not that loss‐absorption through write‐down is accompanied by conversion to equity).
115The FSB Key Attribute 5.2: creditors should have a right to compensation where they do not receive at a minimum
what they would have received in a liquidation of the firm under the applicable insolvency regime.
GUO 19interpretation to the understanding of Article 5 in its application of cross‐border bank insol-
vency and bank resolution. Based on this article, several issues are clarified and ascertained.
With regard to the outgoing effects of Chinese bank resolution measures, the ultimate deci-
sion is in the hands of China's counterparts. However, it is proposed that the contractual
approach could be an interim solution in the absence of statutory arrangements. Contractual
approaches could be applied to, for instance, bail‐in tool and temporary stay on early termina-
tion rights.
On the other hand, the incoming effectiveness of foreign resolution measures has to be firstly
recognised in China. Three major tests in terms of recognition and enforcement are interna-
tional agreement, reciprocity, and public policy exception. International agreements should take
into account specific banking sector agreements. Reciprocity should be interpreted more
broadly so that the court can grant recognition and enforcement without real reciprocity
existing in the other jurisdictions before. Public policy exception would still be the safeguard
measure and in terms of cross‐border bank resolution, financial stability, and equal treatment
of creditors should be the main concerns.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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